Smelly Urine Vitamine B

Point by point

Giuliano Ferrara today writes a long piece in the newspaper of the brother of the Prime Minister, explaining the reasons why we should do justice reform proposed by the Government chaired by the brother of the owner of the newspaper that hosts the piece.
Ferrara is not the first idiot hacks, and in fact, his article is very suggestive: to dismantle it is necessary to analyze the steps salient point by point.

the investigating magistrate must be equated with the defender, while judges who must stand above the parties. This is the "separation of careers." Without it, there is no true justice, there is a grotesque caricature of justice. If the lawyer is a beggar's rights barely tolerated while the prosecutor who investigates and promotes the charge is a colleague who will issue a decision, working with him, does the same career, leans to the same office, has the court for a daily attendance and a community of corporate and professional interests, justice is denied in the root. If you can judge people who are now pursuing tomorrow, and vice versa, the denial adds insult

As mentioned in previous days, the problem of the common career is very different from the problem of equating the case of the prosecution and defense. In most of the smaller Italian courts there is a commonality of interests, acquaintances and leisure much higher among judges and lawyers than there is between the judicial and PM. This is because the judging is often there for a long time, if there is even born, he attended the circles of high society, goes to the golf, tennis and so on, while the PM in the small towns is often early in his career, and expects to going to make the leap to a larger center. The fact of being part of the same company is much stronger in the control of the same Ministry or of having a career decided by the CSM: This I am sure that Ferrara did not ignore it, but do not mention.
The embankment to the potential conflict of interest or customization of the link between one of the parties to the proceedings and the court lies in the professionalism of the judge, he has the obligation to justify its measures, and when considering that those reasons have to face the courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. The separation of careers in itself means nothing, or does not mean more than it means the separation of golf clubs. An organic law that would bring the concept of the separation between the prosecutor and judges should rule that courts may only practice golf, tennis and PM only defense lawyers just riding, doing undermines the possibility that the three process actors can come together in a dressing room.
regard to the fact that those who pursues today tomorrow can judge, and vice versa, we have already made it clear that this is the rule in common law systems, to which the Ferrara is so attached. Strange that one who has dubbed it the "elephant" has a memory so short.

The second element is the responsibility to the citizens in the exercise of the profession of judge. If an official of any wrong, and perhaps intentionally or otherwise overwhelming the rights of the citizen, that officer reasonably pay the consequences of error, is civilly liable for his behavior. Without this rule, the officer of the Registry can take a sleepy and distracted when he farts apply for a certificate of coffee per hour. And the irresponsibility of the judiciary has more serious consequences of a mockery or a delay in issuing an ID card: it weighs on people's lives, their honor, on affects, health, freedom of us all

The Ferrara equates a purely executive role, such as the issuing of identity card with one that requires intelligence and skill and that is inherently subject to error. The official registry sleepy should not make decisions based on data almost always insufficient. No one has photographed Franzoni who killed her son, but the court's task is to establish, even in the absence of a test objective, if she has or has not done. The magistrate is of course subject to error, because it could exercise if it were not convicted and confessed only those caught in the act, which, I believe, no one would want. The current legislation regarding the liability of the judge ( a summary here) provides that a magistrate be liable for willful misconduct or gross negligence, like the doctor and architect (Alfano and yet continue to support the reform he proposed to equate the magistrate to the doctor!). Are now excluded from the activities of professional liability interpretation of provisions of law or the assessment of facts and evidence, and this for the simple reason that such activities are inevitably fallible and subject to appeal for that very reason. Imagine being in the role of the judge to decide murder of poor Scazzi, and that whatever decision or the father or daughter could then come to your decision to account for the mere fact of being wrong, but not for negligence in good faith and using your skills to the full. Do you believe that in this situation you would be able to decide? And, well, follow me, if indeed the judiciary is entrenched in self-defense infamous caste of each component, if indeed each judge has the sole interest to defend their colleagues, do you really believe that the Court of Appeals overturn a decision of the Court, knowing that this would ruin the judge who pronounced the sentence? No: If the judiciary is indeed composed only of the infamous, successive sets of proceedings would become mere jokes.

The third simple truth is that you can not be tried a second time after being acquitted. Why? It's easy to say. The common law provides that people can be convicted only if they are considered guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" (the lawyer Perry Mason in the old TV series had this warranty to find the real culprit and exonerate the innocent). The exclusion of every possible shade of opinion is an objective anchor, a decisive guarantee for civil liberties. For us the principle is that you can give award on the "free conviction of the judge," a purely subjective criterion. But that freedom must be anchored to the objectivity of the court to a certainty as the basis for a review in due process. And it is obvious that an acquittal leaves and will always leave a reasonable doubt in the air, even if the court of appeal came a conviction. So: no double jeopardy once the accused will be acquitted because there is no absolute certainty case

Here Ferrara, who earlier had forgotten to remember how things work in America, once the omelette. This time you forget that in Italy the art. 533 Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the sentence is pronounced if the offense is proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" and not on the basis of free conviction of the judge.
But this is not the point: the point is that in the Anglo-Saxon system is that a jury decide the fact, and that does not justify its decision. 'S why the decision (acquittal or conviction ) is not subject to appeal, because the decision on the fact being unreasonable is not subject to appeal.
In Italy the decision is that the law, must be substantiated. And on the basis of motivation (or lack of motivation), the court decides whether to appeal the magistrate who pronounced sentence has correctly assessed the evidence and whether or not the legal characterization of facts. We note, incidentally, most of which in Italy is a magistrate sitting alone, and this subject much more than a jury of twelve civilians to consider, in the cases really in doubt, only part of the evidence, or erroneously assessed the weight.
In the French system, until 2000, decisions of the Court of Assizes (structured like the Italian one, so popular with the judges who decide on fact and law) was no appeal, either by the prosecution to the defense. Poi è stata introdotta la possibilità dell'appello anche lì. In ogni caso, quel che deve essere ben chiaro è che non si vede da nessuna parte un sistema in cui l'appello sia consentito solo alla difesa e non all'accusa